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Abstract: Under domestic U.S. sales law, usage of trade is relevant in
ascertaining the meaning of an agreement, and it can be used to supplement,
qualify, or explain an agreement. However, usage of trade may not be used
under domestic U.S. sales law to contradict a written agreement. Moreover, any
course of performance or course of dealing between the parties will prevail over
inconsistent usage of trade. The United Nations Convention on Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods, or CISG, similarly provides for consideration of
usage to establish the terms of the agreement between the parties, as well as to
determine party intent. When applying the CISG, U.S. courts have assumed that
the same hierarchy they are accustomed to under domestic U.S. sales law that
automatically relegates usage to a subsidiary role must exist under the CISG as
well. But the CISG does not establish a hierarchy that requires usage to defer
automatically to party conduct or to established party practice. Usage can be
important for determining the terms of the agreement between the parties,
especially when a commercial arrangement is consummated without a robust
written agreement. Therefore, proper analysis of the role of usage is essential.
This Article analyzes this issue and proposes a better understanding of the role
of usage in the sale of goods contracts governed by the CISG.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine an ornate boardroom at the top of an office tower overlooking
a fast-paced, exciting, non-U.S. city, where a complex international
business deal is negotiated and eventually finalized by sophisticated
businesspersons and their counselors. The members of the negotiation
teams speak different languages and engage in different business practices.
They likely have different negotiation styles and values. But each is
focused on getting the deal done.
Now imagine the tools used in connection with this negotiation
involving parties from different parts of the world: smartphones,
notebooks, leather briefcases, expensive business attire.
And what of their eventual contract? Perhaps an impressive image
comes to mind of a lengthy, complicated, carefully drafted agreement,
written in two languages, with multiple original copies, all signed by the
parties and their respective witnesses. The agreement certainly has
numerous exhibits attached to it.
These exhibits were expressly
incorporated into the agreement by reference, and they identify in detail the
specific responsibilities of the parties, the scope of their arrangement, an
agreed-upon means of measuring satisfactory performance, forms of
ancillary agreements, and the allocation of a variety of anticipated risks.
These archetypal images, portrayed in film and literature, reflect one
face of the international business transaction experience, and the impressive
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written agreement is one iteration of the many kinds of contracts that are
made by parties to business transactions. At times, contracting parties take
the time to put in place a comprehensive written agreement that sets forth
the mutually agreed-upon terms of their business deal. More often than one
might imagine, however, commercial arrangements simply do not result in
an executed written agreement that reflects the agreed-upon terms and
allocation of risk and responsibility between the parties.1 The fast pace of
the world of commerce, the potential strain on the business relationship
caused by an intense negotiation, the high cost of a business lawyer’s time,
the opportunity cost of the businessperson’s time, and the belief that
nothing bad will happen can all contribute to a simple failure to establish in
writing the agreed-upon terms of the deal.
Even though the parties have not adopted a formal writing entitled
“CONTRACT” or “AGREEMENT,” once the parties reach a mutual
understanding regarding their business arrangement and commence
performance, they surely have a contract nevertheless, even though there is
no written agreement that embodies the agreed-upon terms of that contract.
This is true under different legal traditions. 2 To the extent that the parties
have not expressly reached agreement, the law will fill the gaps with default
contract terms, and those default terms are just as binding as if they were
expressly written into the agreement by the parties themselves.
Expecting good things to happen, the parties may be oblivious to the
nature of the terms that the law will recognize as binding terms of their
unwritten contract. If the arrangement proceeds as planned, no unexpected
contingencies materialize, and no losses occur, then the parties are likely to
be happy and the terms of the contract between the parties are unlikely to
matter.
But sometimes things go wrong. Sometimes serious contingencies
materialize that cause at least one of the parties to be unable to perform, to
regret the bargain struck, or to suffer significant unanticipated losses.
Similarly, sometimes there are serious misunderstandings between the
parties regarding their actual intent for the contractual allocation of risk and
responsibility, whether due to cultural differences, language barriers, haste
in the consummation of the transaction, or other causes.
Those
contingencies and misunderstandings can cause the relationship to
deteriorate in such a way that the parties no longer have any expectation
that good things will happen. When those kinds of situations arise, disputes
often follow, and the terms of the contract can matter a great deal.
In such a case, the express terms of the contract may be reflected in a
1
For some discussion of the actual practices of parties to commercial contracts with
respect to entering into written agreements, see generally DANIEL KEATING, SALES: A
SYSTEMS APPROACH 95–97 (5th ed. 2011).
2
See, e.g., THE PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW arts. 2.101 & 2.102 (2002);
U.C.C. §§ 2-204(1), 2-207(3) (2011); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 19 (1981).
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variety of documents or sources, including communications between the
parties (written, electronic, or even oral), order documents, shipping
documents, standard terms and conditions, and the like. But the parties’
bargain may also be reflected in other, less obvious sources, such as their
conduct under the contract at issue, 3 their conduct in the past,4 and the
practices of other actors in the applicable industry or trade. 5 Any or all of
these sources could potentially be used to determine the terms of the
contract between the parties as well, within the United States and in other
jurisdictions.
But what if these disparate sources conflict? What if the parties’
conduct in the past is at odds with the parties’ conduct under this contract?
What if the parties are behaving under this contract in a way that is
inconsistent with the way similarly situated parties operating in the same
industry behave under like contracts?
Under U.S. domestic law applicable to commercial transactions,
finding the answers to these questions is generally quite simple. The
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) establishes a clear hierarchy when
considering various sources to determine the terms of a contract governed
by the UCC.6 Under the UCC, the parties’ behavior under the contract at
issue will prevail over the parties’ behavior in the past.7 The parties’ own
3
See, e.g., THE PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW art. 1.105 (2002); U.C.C. § 1303(a), (d) (2011).
4
See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-303(b), (d) (2011); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 223
(1981).
5
See, e.g., THE PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW art. 1.105 (2002); U.C.C. § 1303(c)–(d) (2011); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 221 (1981).
6
See U.C.C. § 1-303(e) (2011). The UCC has been widely adopted into the law of the
states of the United States. Article 2 of the UCC generally applies to all transactions in
goods. See id. § 2-102 (2011). Article 2 of the UCC defines “goods:”

“Goods” means all things (including specially manufactured goods) which are
movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale other than the money
in which the price is to be paid, investment securities (Article 8) and things in
action. “Goods” also includes the unborn young of animals and growing crops and
other identified things attached to realty as described in the section on goods to be
severed from realty (Section 2-107).
Id. § 2-105(1). Thus, the scope of Article 2 of the UCC is quite broad. Moreover, Article 2
of the UCC has been adopted by every state throughout the United States, other than the
State of Louisiana, making Article 2 the primary domestic sales law in the United States.
See Uniform Commercial Code Locator, CORNELL UNIVERSITY LAW SCHOOL—LEGAL
INFORMATION INSTITUTE, http://www.law.cornell.edu/uniform/ucc.html#a2 (last visited Dec.
12, 2011). See also UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, UCC ARTICLE 2, SALES AND ARTICLE 2A,
LEASES (2003), SUMMARY, http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=UCC%
20Article%202,Sales%20and%20Article%202A,%20Leases%20%282003%29 (last visited
Dec. 12, 2011).
7
Specifically, course of performance prevails over course of dealing. U.C.C. § 1-303(e)
(2011).
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behavior in the past will prevail over the conduct of other parties in the
industry.8 Express terms will prevail over all of the foregoing. 9
But what if the goods cross an international border? What if the
transaction involves vegetables entering Texas from Mexico?
Or
automotive parts made in China that enter the United States by means of a
Great Lakes port? Or costly machinery that is sold into Canada by a North
Dakota manufacturer? Should the analysis by a U.S. court be any different?
Some U.S. courts have apparently assumed that the rules of the game
are the same. 10 That assumption is false. The analysis is different because
the UCC will not govern the international sale of goods in the typical case. 11
Instead, for many international sales of commercial goods, the United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
(CISG) will govern the transaction.12 The hierarchy that is present in the
UCC is absent in the CISG; and analysis under the CISG, reflecting not
only the common law but also the intentional influence of different legal,
economic, and social systems,13 is different from analysis under the UCC,
8

Specifically, course of dealing prevails over usage of trade. Id.
Id.; see also id. § 2-202.
10
See, e.g., Treibacher Industrie, A.G. v. Allegheny Techs., Inc., 464 F.3d 1235, 1238–
39 (11th Cir. 2006); Hanwha Corp. v. Cedar Petrochemicals., Inc., 760 F. Supp. 2d 426, 433
(S.D.N.Y. 2011). In each case, the court assumed an automatic hierarchy that would cause
party conduct to prevail over usage as an extrinsic source of contract terms, as discussed in
Parts I.A and V.A, infra.
11
While Article 2 of the UCC generally governs transactions in goods, see U.C.C. § 2102 (2011), the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
or CISG, infra note 12, will preempt the UCC when the CISG is applicable because the
CISG, as a treaty made under the authority of the United States, is part of the supreme law of
the land. For additional analysis by the author of preemption of the UCC by the CISG, see
William P. Johnson, Understanding Exclusion of the CISG: A New Paradigm of Determining
Party Intent, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 213, 223–26 (2011).
12
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, opened
for signature Apr. 11, 1980, S. TREATY DOC. No. 98-9 (1983), 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into
force Jan. 1, 1988) [hereinafter CISG]. Subject to certain exclusions, the CISG governs
contracts for the sale of goods between parties whose places of business are in different
countries when the countries are “Contracting States” (or parties to the CISG). Id. art.
1(1)(a). In the typical cross-border sale of goods transaction, when the parties know the
goods are crossing an international border, the CISG will usually govern the transaction, if
the parties’ places of business that are most directly involved with the transaction are in
countries that have ratified the CISG. See id. arts. 1(2), 10(a). Because there are currently
78 parties to the CISG, including most of the major trading partners of the United States, the
CISG is potentially relevant for a very large volume of international trade. See Dep’t of
State Pub. Notice 1004, 52 Fed. Reg. 6262 (Mar. 2. 1987); see also U. N. Treaty Collection,
Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General, ch. X 10: International Trade and
Development, United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
Status (last updated Apr. 18, 2009), available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/
MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20X/X-10.en.pdf [hereinafter CISG Status].
13
See CISG, supra note 12, pmbl.; see also CISG, supra note 12, at explanatory note by
the UNCITRAL Secretariat on the UN Convention on Contracts for the Int’l Sale of Goods,
¶ 3 [hereinafter CISG Explanatory Note]. The CISG Explanatory Note was prepared by the
9
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leading to different questions, different answers, and different outcomes.
Yet, the simplicity and familiarity of the UCC and its hierarchical approach
to extrinsic sources of contract terms is a tempting siren’s call that U.S.
courts have been unable to resist.
In addition to finding a non-existent hierarchy in the CISG, U.S. courts
have improperly imported UCC concepts of “course of dealing” and
“course of performance” into their analysis of contracts governed by the
CISG, even though course of performance and course of dealing are terms
that do not appear in the CISG. Focusing on UCC concepts of course of
performance and course of dealing has caused U.S. courts to fail to take
note of and to apply carefully the CISG provisions that pertain to the CISG
concept, “practices which [the parties] have established between
themselves . . . .”14
As a consequence of UCC bias, U.S. courts have utterly failed to
recognize the different approach required by the CISG, leaving
businesspersons engaging in international sales transactions with
unnecessary and undesirable uncertainty regarding the terms of their sales
contracts. That uncertainty increases transaction costs and undermines
efficiency. U.S. courts’ incorrect analysis and misapplication of the CISG
also hinder realization of the goals of the CISG to promote uniformity in its
application and to contribute to the development of international trade.15
A different approach is needed. U.S. courts must engage in more
careful analysis and application of the CISG and discontinue improperly
relegating “usage” to a subsidiary position of deference not contemplated or
supported by the CISG. Similarly, U.S. courts must not prematurely import
UCC concepts into their analysis of the CISG or fail to take note of CISG
concepts with which the U.S. court might not be familiar.
This Article identifies some of the multi-faceted problems that have
arisen as a result of inaccurate perception by U.S. courts of the role usage is
to play in a court’s analysis of contracts governed by the CISG. The
relationship between usage and practices the parties have established
between themselves has been one significant problem in this area. This
Article seeks to bring understanding to that relationship. This Article also
identifies the role that usage is actually to play under the CISG—a role that
is different from and more prominent than the role prescribed by the UCC.
Finally, this Article identifies an analytical framework that courts can use to
apply properly Article 9 of the CISG.

UNCITRAL Secretariat for informational purposes and is not an official commentary to the
CISG. See id.
14
Id. art. 9(1); see also id. arts. 8(3) & 18(3).
15
See id. pmbl. & art. 7(1).
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I. IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM: MISAPPLICATION OF ARTICLE 9
OF THE CISG
When the CISG is applicable to a contract for the sale of goods, usage
can become a binding term of the contract pursuant to Article 9 of the
CISG,16 which U.S. courts have recognized. In fact, notwithstanding the
occasional lingering claim by U.S. courts that there is a dearth of U.S. case
law analyzing or applying the CISG, which is no longer true, 17 several U.S.
courts have applied Article 9 of the CISG. 18 Some have even considered
the role of usage in analysis of issues under the CISG. 19 Unfortunately,
much of that analysis has been faulty.
The CISG bears some similarities to Article 2 of the UCC, 20 and for
16

See id. art. 9. Article 9 provides as follows:
(1) The parties are bound by any usage to which they have agreed and by any
practices which they have established between themselves.
(2) The parties are considered, unless otherwise agreed, to have impliedly made
applicable to their contract or its formation a usage of which the parties knew or
ought to have known and which in international trade is widely known to, and
regularly observed by, parties to contracts of the type involved in the particular
trade concerned.

Id.

17

As recently as early 2011, a federal district court in New York asserted that “caselaw
interpreting the CISG is relatively sparse . . . .” Hanwha Corp. v. Cedar Petrochemicals.,
Inc., 760 F. Supp. 2d 426, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). That simply is no longer true, even with
respect to U.S. case law; and it has not been true with respect to case law of non-U.S. courts
for years. See Lisa Spagnolo, A Glimpse Through the Kaleidoscope: Choices of Law and the
CISG (Kaleidoscope Part I), 13 VINDOBONA J. INT’L COM. L. & ARB. 135, 153 & n.81 (2009)
(stating that scarcity of CISG case law is a misconception and pointing out that there were at
that time already more than 2,000 CISG cases on the Pace University CISG website).
18
See, e.g., Treibacher Industrie, A.G. v. Allegheny Techs., Inc., 464 F.3d 1235, 1238–
39 (11th Cir. 2006); BP Oil Int’l, Ltd. v. Empresa Estatal Petroleos de Ecuador, 332 F.3d
333, 337–38 (5th Cir. 2003), as amended on denial of reh’g; Riccitelli v. Elemar New
England Marble & Granite, LLC, No. 3:08CV01783 (DJS), 2010 WL 3767111, at *5–6 (D.
Conn. Sept. 14, 2010); ECEM European Chem. Mktg. B.V. v. Purolite Co., Civil Action No.
05-3078, 2010 WL 419444, at *13 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 29, 2010); Berry v. Ken M. Spooner
Farms, Inc., No. C05-5538FDB, 2006 WL 1009299 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 13, 2006), rev’d 254
Fed. Appx. 646 (9th Cir. 2007); China N. Chem. Indus. Corp. v. Beston Chem. Corp., No.
Civ.A. H-04-0912, 2006 WL 295395, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 7, 2006); St. Paul Guardian Ins.
Co. v. Neuromed Med. Sys. & Support, GmbH, No. 00 CIV. 9344(SHS), 2002 WL 465312,
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002); Shuttle Packaging Sys., L.L.C. v. Tsonakis, No. 1:01-CV691, 2001 WL 34046276, at *1–2 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 17, 2001); Claudia v. Olivieri Footwear
Ltd., No. 96 Civ. 8052(HB)(THK), 1998 WL 164824, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 1998).
19
See, e.g., Treibacher Industrie, A.G., 464 F.3d at 1237–39; BP Oil Int’l, Ltd., 332 F.3d
at 337–38; China N. Chem. Indus. Corp., 2006 WL 295395 at *6; St. Paul Guardian Ins. Co.,
2002 WL 465312 at *3–4.
20
The supposed similarities between the UCC and the CISG have been noted by
numerous U.S. courts and some commentators. See, e.g., Schmitz-Werke GmbH & Co. v.
Rockland Indus., Inc., 37 F. Appx. 687, 691 (4th Cir. 2002); Delchi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex
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that reason, there is a temptation for U.S. courts simply to engage in UCClike analysis of CISG provisions that are seemingly analogous to provisions
of Article 2 of the UCC. In fact, U.S. courts have routinely asserted that
UCC analysis of analogous CISG provisions is appropriate. 21
Unfortunately, this has even been supported by some commentators.22 But
engaging in such analysis is not appropriate; it can readily lead to
misapplication of CISG provisions and to wrongly decided outcomes. 23 It
also undermines the stated purpose of the CISG to promote uniform rules
governing contracts for the international sale of goods. As Professor
Franco Ferrari has cogently argued, it is both “impermissible and dangerous
to assert that the concepts of the CISG and the UCC are analogous.”24 U.S.
courts’ misapplication of Article 9 provides one example of the
consequences of failing to recognize that the CISG is not the same as the
UCC.
A. Treibacher Industrie, A.G. v. Allegheny Technologies, Inc. and the
Eleventh Circuit’s Improper Imposition of Automatic Hierarchy
One problem that has flowed from the bias for UCC-style analysis of
CISG provisions perceived to be analogous to the UCC is the subsidiary
role to which usage has improperly been relegated as one source for
determining the terms of the parties’ agreement. One notable example of
this is Treibacher Industrie, A.G. v. Allegheny Technologies, Inc. and the
Eleventh Circuit’s unsupported claim that “under the CISG, the meaning
the parties ascribe to a contractual term in their course of dealings
establishes the meaning of that term in the face of a conflicting customary
usage of the term.”25 That statement reflects a confused view of the
applicable provisions of the CISG that is inaccurate in at least two ways: its
Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1028 (2d Cir. 1995); Hanwha Corp., 760 F. Supp. 2d at 430; Raw
Materials, Inc. v. Manfred Forberich GmbH & Co., No. 03 C 1154, 2004 WL 1535839, at
*3–4 (N.D. Ill. July 7, 2004); JOSEPH LOOKOFSKY, UNDERSTANDING THE CISG 45 n.250 (3d
ed. 2008); see also Letter of Submittal from George P. Schultz, U.S. Sec’y of State, to
Ronald Reagan, President of the United States of Am. (Aug. 30, 1983), in S. TREATY DOC.
No. 98-9, at vi (1983) (“It will be noted that the Convention embodies the substance of many
of the important provisions of the UCC and is generally consistent with its approach and
outlook.”).
21
See, e.g., Schmitz-Werke GmbH, 37 F. App’x at 691; Delchi Carrier SpA, 71 F.3d at
1028; Hanwha Corp., 760 F. Supp. 2d at 430; Raw Materials, 2004 WL 1535839, at *3–4.
22
See, e.g., LOOKOFSKY, supra note 20, at 45 n.250.
23
See Ronald A. Brand & Harry M. Flechtner, Arbitration and Contract Formation in
International Trade: First Interpretations of the U.N. Sales Convention, 12 J.L. & COM. 239,
241 (1993) (“[A]lthough the Convention contains many terms and concepts that appear
similar to ones in domestic U.S. law, the apparent similarity can be misleading. It is easy to
distort the unfamiliar by forcing it into a pattern we already know.”).
24
Franco Ferrari, The Relationship Between the UCC and the CISG and the Construction
of Uniform Law, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1021, 1023 (1996).
25
Treibacher Industrie, A.G. v. Allegheny Techs., Inc., 464 F.3d 1235, 1240 (11th Cir.
2006).
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use of the term “course of dealing” and its assumption that there is an
automatic hierarchy.
The dispute in Treibacher Industrie arose out of two written
agreements entered into by Treibacher Industrie, A.G. (Treibacher), an
Austrian company and the seller in the transaction, and TDY Industries,
Inc. (TDY), a U.S. company and the buyer, for the sale of specified
quantities of tantalum carbide, a hard metal powder, which was to be
delivered “to consignment.”26 Treibacher began to supply the product, but
after TDY received some of the product, TDY refused to accept additional
deliveries and took the position that it was not obligated to do so. 27 After
selling the remaining quantities of product to third parties at a loss,
Treibacher filed suit against TDY, asserting six different claims, including
breach of contract under the CISG and misrepresentation. 28 Following a
motion for summary judgment that eliminated Treibacher’s other claims,
Treibacher’s remaining claims for breach of contract and misrepresentation
were tried to the bench sitting without a jury.29
At its heart, the dispute concerned whether TDY was obligated by
contract to take and pay for the entire quantity of product specified in the
written agreements.30 The genesis of the dispute was use by the parties in
their written agreements of the term “consignment” and the disagreement
between the parties regarding the meaning and effect of that term. 31 TDY’s
position was that there was no obligation to take and pay for specified
quantities of product unless and until TDY took the product out of
consignment and used it.32 TDY introduced evidence of usage in the
applicable trade that supported that understanding of the term
consignment. 33 Treibacher took the position that, notwithstanding use of
the term consignment in their written agreements, the parties had an
understanding that TDY was bound to take and pay for one hundred percent
of the quantity of product specified in the written agreements. 34 Treibacher
also offered evidence of the parties’ conduct to support its position. 35
Accepting Treibacher’s position on the matter, the trial court awarded
Treibacher damages, and TDY appealed. 36
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the trial court’s judgment. 37
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

Id. at 1236, 1236 n.1.
Id. at 1236.
Id. at 1236, 1236 n.3.
Id.
Id. at 1236–37.
Treibacher Industrie, A.G., 464 F.3dat 1236–37.
Id. at 1237.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Treibacher Industrie, A.G., 464 F.3d.at 1237.
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In reaching its holding, the Eleventh Circuit stated in its opinion that the
trial court had ruled that under the CISG “evidence of the parties’
interpretation of the term [consignment] in their course of dealings trumped
evidence of the term’s customary usage in the industry . . . .”38 And the
Eleventh Circuit continued by asserting that “the district court did not make
a finding regarding the customary usage of the term because it found that
the parties had established a meaning for the term in their course of
dealings, thus rendering customary usage irrelevant.”39
The Eleventh Circuit, in its de novo review of application of the CISG,
should have looked carefully at the CISG and corrected what would have
amounted to a misstatement of law. But a careful review of the trial court’s
judgment reveals that the trial court did not conclude that an apparent
course of dealing automatically trumps a conflicting usage or that course of
dealing would render usage irrelevant. 40 Rather, the trial court focused on
determining the parties’ actual intent regarding the meaning of the term
consignment, which it did by carefully reviewing the evidence that was
available to it.41 The trial court ultimately found that the parties shared an
intent that TDY was obligated to purchase the quantities specified in the
written agreements.42
Indeed, although it referred repeatedly to course of dealing in its
Memorandum of Decision, 43 the trial court otherwise essentially engaged in
the kind of analysis that the CISG requires. The trial court looked carefully
at the contract documents and order documents actually used by the parties,
and it considered the parties’ communications, 44 their subsequent conduct, 45
and the credibility of witnesses and their testimony. 46
Based on its review of all of the circumstances of the case, described in
some detail in seventeen pages of its Memorandum of Decision, the trial
court found as a matter of fact that the parties intended to enter into a
contract of sale of goods, “with transfer of title and payment deferred until
withdrawal [of the goods from consignment], such withdrawal to occur
within a (mutually agreed) reasonable time.” 47
38

Id. (emphasis added). The Eleventh Circuit also stated, correctly, that the court below
“found that Treibacher and TDY, in their course of dealings, understood the term to mean
‘that a sale had occurred, but that invoices would be delayed until the materials were
withdrawn.’” Id.
39
Id. at 1237 n.4 (emphasis added).
40
See Memorandum of Decision, Treibacher Industrie, A.G. v. TDY Indus., Inc., Case
No.: CV-01-HS-2872-NE (N.D. Ala. Apr. 27, 2005).
41
See id. at 5–14.
42
See id. at 5–6, & 21.
43
See id. at 1, 5, 9, & 18–20.
44
See id. at 9–10, & 12–14.
45
See id. at 5–6 & 10.
46
See id. at 2 n.2.
47
Id. at 21.
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The trial court did not devote an inordinate amount of time to the
consideration of arguably applicable trade usages. That does not mean that
the trial court concluded that usage was automatically irrelevant. Indeed,
notwithstanding the Eleventh Circuit’s statements, the trial court clearly did
consider the evidence pertaining to usage, and it ultimately found the
evidence to be inconsistent and unhelpful in respect of determining party
intent. In fact, the trial court specifically acknowledged that there was
evidence that, within the U.S. hard metals market, the trade usage of the
term “consignment” meant that there was no obligation to pay for materials
unless and until they were withdrawn from consignment. The court
therefore considered evidence of usage without characterizing that evidence
as irrelevant.48 The trial court noted that it “heard conflicting testimony
regarding the meaning of the term [consignment] in the industry.”49
Ultimately, the trial court found, based on the evidence available to it,
including the parties’ practices and their conduct, that the parties actually
intended the term “consignment” to include an obligation, binding on TDY,
to take and pay for all materials held by it on consignment. 50 That finding
is a sensible finding that is supported by the record.
The trial court made its finding without making any express
conclusion regarding any automatic hierarchical relationship between usage
and course of dealing. Such a conclusion was unnecessary for the
disposition of the case. Why the Eleventh Circuit decided that it was
necessary to add its broad and inaccurate statement is unclear, and it is
unfortunate that it occurred.
One
possible
explanation
for
the
Eleventh
Circuit’s
mischaracterization of the record is its focus on an argument made by TDY
in support of its position that its proposed definition of “consignment”
derived from usage ought to control. Specifically, TDY argued that, “under
the CISG, a contract term should be construed according to its customary
usage in the industry unless the parties have expressly agreed to another
usage.”51 The Eleventh Circuit appropriately rejected that desperate attempt
to distort the language of the CISG, but it went too far, concluding that “the
parties’ usage of a term in their course of dealings controls that term’s
meaning in the face of a conflicting customary usage of the term.” 52
B. The Influence of the UCC
Had the court been applying the UCC, its statement would have been
generally accurate, though perhaps oversimplified. Under the UCC, course
48

Id. at 19.
Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
50
See id. at 5–6, 21.
51
Treibacher Industrie, A.G. v. Allegheny Techs., Inc., 464 F.3d 1235, 1237 (11th Cir.
2006).
52
Id. at 1239.
49
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of performance,53 course of dealing,54 and usage of trade,55 as those terms
are defined in Section 1-303 of the UCC, can become part of the agreement
between the parties without express incorporation by the parties. 56 When
applicable usage of trade, course of dealing, and course of performance
seem to conflict, the UCC establishes a hierarchy. A court is first to
construe those extrinsic sources of contract terms to be consistent with each
other whenever the court can reasonably do so. 57 If the conflict cannot be
reconciled, then course of dealing prevails over usage of trade, and course
of performance prevails over both. 58 The CISG, by contrast, does not create
a hierarchical relationship between usage and course of performance or
course of dealing. In fact, the CISG does not even use the term course of
dealing or the term course of performance. U.S. courts have not accounted
for this when conducting analysis under the CISG of behavior that appears
to establish a course of dealing, as that term is understood under the UCC.
Instead of course of dealing or course of performance, the CISG refers
to “practices which [the parties] have established between themselves,” 59
which is, of course, a different term that has its meaning derived not from
the UCC but from the CISG. Such party practice becomes a term of the
parties’ agreement, insofar as “[t]he parties are bound” thereby by virtue of
establishing the practice between themselves. 60 The CISG also includes
“subsequent conduct of the parties” as one of the relevant circumstances
courts are directed to consider when determining party intent. 61 Thus, under
both the CISG and the UCC, the behavior of the parties can be indicative of
their shared intent to be bound. How that behavior is to be analyzed and
ultimately incorporated into the parties’ agreement is certainly not the same
53

The UCC defines “course of performance” to mean:
[A] sequence of conduct between the parties to a particular transaction that exists
if: (1) the agreement of the parties with respect to the transaction involves repeated
occasions for performance by a party; and (2) the other party, with knowledge of
the nature of the performance and opportunity for objection to it, accepts the
performance or acquiesces in it without objection.

U.C.C. § 1-303(a) (2011).
54
Course of dealing is defined as “a sequence of conduct concerning previous
transactions between the parties to a particular transaction that is fairly to be regarded as
establishing a common basis of understanding for interpreting their expressions and other
conduct.” Id. § 1-303(b).
55
Usage of trade is defined in the UCC as “any practice or method of dealing having
such regularity of observance in a place, vocation, or trade as to justify an expectation that it
will be observed with respect to the transaction in question.” Id. § 1-303(c).
56
See U.C.C. § 1-303(d) (2011).
57
Id. § 1-303(e).
58
Id.
59
CISG, supra note 12, art. 9(1).
60
Id.
61
Id. art. 8(3).
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under the CISG and the UCC. While the CISG concepts are similar in
some respects and will at times have the same or similar effects, the
concepts are not equivalent and the appropriate methods of analysis are
distinct. In any event, the CISG does not establish a hierarchy that causes
conduct to prevail automatically over usage or that renders usage irrelevant.
The Eleventh Circuit’s assertion to the contrary, claiming an automatic
hierarchy, is not supported by the text of the CISG.
It is really no surprise that some U.S. courts are influenced by their
understanding of the UCC and the common law when applying provisions
of the CISG. This “homeward trend” was identified early in the history of
the CISG.62 And under some limited circumstances, when a question
governed by the CISG is not expressly settled by the CISG, it is eventually
possible to answer the question “in conformity with the law applicable by
virtue of the rules of private international law.” 63 In the limited
circumstances when that occurs, any court adjudicating a conflict before it
that is governed by the CISG will have its own rules of private international
law, or conflicts of laws, and should apply those rules to determine the
substantive body of law that would govern the dispute pursuant to those
rules. In the United States, that will often be the UCC, unless the parties
have effectively selected the laws of a jurisdiction outside the United
States.64 But courts should not leap to domestic principles to answer
questions that are answerable by reference to the text of the CISG.
Even when the question is not expressly settled by the text of the
CISG, the question must be answered, when possible, “in conformity with
62

See generally JOHN HONNOLD, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE UNIFORM LAW FOR
INT’L SALES (Kluwer Int’l 1989); Harry Flechtner, Article 79 of the United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) as Rorschach Test: The
Homeward Trend and Exemption for Delivering Non-Conforming Goods, 19 PACE INT’L L.
REV. 29, 30–31 (2007).
63
CISG, supra note 12, art. 7(2).
64
In the United States, under the UCC, the parties are free to choose the state or country
whose laws will govern their transaction, as long as the transaction bears a reasonable
relation to the state or country selected: “Except as otherwise provided in this section, when
a transaction bears a reasonable relation to this state and also to another state or nation the
parties may agree that the law either of this state or of such other state or nation shall govern
their rights and duties.” U.C.C. § 1-301(a) (2011). The official comments to Section 1-301
of the UCC confirm that the parties to a multi-state transaction or a transaction involving
foreign trade have the right to choose their own law, but that the right to choose their own
law “is limited to jurisdictions to which the transaction bears a ‘reasonable relation.’” Id. §
1-301 official cmt. 1. The official comments continue: “Ordinarily the law chosen must be
that of a jurisdiction where a significant enough portion of the making or performance of the
contract is to occur or occurs.” Id. Thus, if the parties include a choice-of-law clause in
their agreement, U.S. courts will generally enforce the parties’ choice of law, at least when
the jurisdiction selected bears some relationship to the transaction or one or both of the
parties, and perhaps even when it bears no such relationship. If the parties have not
effectively selected a jurisdiction’s law to govern their contract, U.S. courts will generally
apply the UCC. See id. § 1-301(b).
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the general principles on which [the CISG] is based,” before the court may
turn to domestic law. 65 Still, courts should begin with the text of the CISG,
but U.S. courts have simply not focused carefully enough on the actual text
of the CISG before leaping to the comfortable UCC.
II. THE APPROACH PRESCRIBED BY THE CISG
A. The Text of the Treaty
The CISG fundamentally is a multilateral treaty. In order to
understand how usage should be applied under the CISG, applicable
international law governing treaty interpretation requires beginning with the
text of the treaty itself. 66 Usage can become part of the parties’ agreement
under Article 9 of the CISG, and it is that article that is the focus of this
analysis. But the term “usage” is used in five different sub-articles of the
CISG.67 Each is briefly described in this Part II.A.
1. Article 9
Most important for analysis of the presumed hierarchical relationship
between “usage” and other extrinsic sources of contract terms (and arguably
for the role of usage under the CISG generally) is Article 9. 68 Article 9 of
the CISG establishes two means for usage to become a binding part of the
agreement between the parties, either as an agreed-upon term or as an
implied term.

65

CISG, supra note 12, art. 7(2).
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), May 23, 1969, 115 U.N.T.S.
331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. While the United States is not a party to the Vienna
Convention, the Vienna Convention is widely recognized as a codification of customary
international law governing treaties. To the extent the Vienna Convention is a codification
of customary international law, it is generally binding as a matter of international law even
on those states that are not parties to the Vienna Convention. See, e.g., Statute of the
International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993.
67
See CISG, supra note 12, arts. 4, 8(3), 9(1), 9(2), & 18(3).
68
Article 9 of the CISG provides in its entirety as follows:
66

(1) The parties are bound by any usage to which they have agreed and by any
practices which they have established between themselves.
(2) The parties are considered, unless otherwise agreed, to have impliedly made
applicable to their contract or its formation a usage of which the parties knew or
ought to have known and which in international trade is widely known to, and
regularly observed by, parties to contracts of the type involved in the particular
trade concerned.
Id. art. 9.
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a. Usage as Agreed-Upon Term
Article 9(1) of the CISG provides that “[t]he parties are bound by any
usage to which they have agreed.”69 The parties are also bound under
Article 9(1) by “any practices which they have established between
themselves.”70 Quite simply, if there is a usage that the parties have agreed
to or there is a practice that they have established between themselves, then
the parties are contractually bound by such usage and by such practice.
There are difficult questions that flow from this provision of the CISG
and its application. For example, how is a court to determine whether the
parties have agreed to a usage? What if it seems the parties have agreed to
a usage, but the usage conflicts with an express term of the parties’ written
agreement? What if the usage conflicts with a practice the parties have
established between themselves? These questions, not answered explicitly
by Article 9(1), must be considered in light of the general principles on
which the CISG is based, discussed in Part II.B.71
b. Usage as Implied Term
Under Article 9(2), if certain requirements are satisfied, a usage can be
deemed to have been made part of the parties’ agreement as an implied
term.72 Article 9(2) provides as follows:
The parties are considered, unless otherwise agreed, to have
impliedly made applicable to their contract or its formation a usage
of which the parties knew or ought to have known and which in
international trade is widely known to, and regularly observed by,
parties to contracts of the type involved in the particular trade
concerned.73

By looking carefully at Article 9(2) and its constituent parts, it is plain
to see that in order to determine whether a usage is an implied term of the
parties’ agreement, the court must consider whether three distinct
requirements are satisfied with respect to the usage in question: (i) whether
the usage in question is a usage that each party either actually knew of or
ought to have known of, (ii) whether in international trade the usage is
widely known to parties to like contracts, and (iii) whether in international
trade the usage is regularly observed by parties to like contracts.
Article 9(2) also provides the parties with an ‘out.’ That is, if there is
some usage that satisfies the three requirements of Article 9(2) that would
automatically become a binding implied term of the parties’ agreement, the
69
70
71
72
73

Id. art. 9(1).
Id.
See id. art. 7(2).
See id. art. 9(2).
Id.
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parties are nevertheless free to agree that the usage is not part of their
agreement.74 If they do so, then the parties’ agreement will prevail over the
default inclusion of the usage as an implied term of their agreement under
Article 9(2). Thus, a sort of logical reasoning can be seen when the
requirements of Article 9(2) can be satisfied, and the logical reasoning
essentially provides as follows:
Similarly situated third parties in international trade know about this
usage, and those third parties abide by the usage.
The parties to this contract also either knew or ought to have known
about this usage, and they did not manifest agreement not to be
bound by it.
Therefore, it is appropriate to conclude that these parties intended to
abide by the usage.

Of course, how the parties manifest agreement not to be bound by any
such usage is a more difficult question. Party conduct could provide
evidence of agreement not to be bound by usage, but courts should not
assume that apparently inconsistent party conduct should automatically
prevail over usage that would be applicable under Article 9(2). The
Illustration in Part II.D. offers one example of how this could be so.
When party conduct appears to constitute a course of dealing or course
of performance under the UCC, the court should remember that those UCC
concepts are not relevant for the Article 9 analysis. Thus, party conduct
should never prevail over usage simply because the court concludes that the
conduct constitutes course of dealing or course of performance. That is not
the proper inquiry under the CISG. Even when the conduct might be
deemed to constitute a practice that the parties have established between
themselves under the CISG, the conduct still should not automatically
prevail over the usage simply because it constitutes established party
practice. The text of Article 9 does not direct courts to apply an automatic
hierarchy, after all.75 Rather, to determine whether usage or party conduct
should prevail in case of an apparent conflict, courts should be guided by
the CISG principles of freedom of contract and determining party intent,
discussed in Part II.B., and courts should conduct their analysis by using the
analytical framework that is contemplated by Article 9.
Ultimately it is important for courts, as well as practitioners and their
clients, to recognize that under Article 9, a usage can become a binding
term of the parties’ agreement, just as surely as if it were unambiguously
written into the agreement. If usage does become a binding term, it should
74
See id. Article 9(2) provides for usage and party practice to become implied terms of
the parties’ agreement, “unless otherwise agreed.” Id.
75
See id. art. 9.
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be treated as any other contract term—which might require additional
interpretation or analysis, as the analytical framework demonstrates.
2. Usage in other Articles of the CISG
a. Article 8(3)
Even when a usage does not become part of the parties’ agreement
under Article 9, usage can still be relevant under Article 8(3) of the CISG
for determining the intent of the parties, including for purposes of
interpreting the parties’ agreement. 76 Courts are directed by Article 8(3) of
the CISG to give “due consideration” to usage (among other things) when
determining the actual intent of the parties, as well as when determining the
understanding a reasonable person would have had with respect to
statements made by a party or other conduct of a party.77 Notably,
consideration of usage to determine party intent is mandatory, not
permissive. 78 That is, it is not simply the case that courts are permitted to
consider usage; they are obligated under Article 8(3) to do so. Moreover,
there is no hierarchy established by Article 8(3) for usage relative to any
other source a court is to consider when determining party intent.
Unlike Article 9(2), Article 8(3) does not limit the scope of usage that
is potentially relevant, in that Article 8(3) does not require the usage to be
usage that the parties knew of or ought to have known of.79 Similarly, the
role to be played by usage under Article 8(3) is not limited to usages that
are widely known to or regularly observed by parties to like contracts in
international trade. 80 Rather, under Article 8(3), any usage—industry
standards, customs in the trade, industry practices, and the like—can be
considered for determining party intent to the extent the usage constitutes a
“relevant circumstance.”81
Of course, it may be sensible for a court to give greater weight to
usages that are known to the parties, as well as to usages that are widely
known and regularly observed by parties to like contracts, when considering
the role usage ought to play in the determination of party intent. Arguably,
this is appropriate under Article 8(3), in light of the need for the court to
give “due consideration” to the usage as a “relevant” circumstance for
76

See id. art. 8(3).
CISG, supra note 12, art. 8(3). Article 8(3) provides specifically as follows: “In
determining the intent of a party or the understanding a reasonable person would have had,
due consideration is to be given to all relevant circumstances of the case including the
negotiations, any practices which the parties have established between themselves, usages
and any subsequent conduct of the parties.” Id.
78
See id. (providing that due consideration “is to be given to all relevant circumstances,”
including usage).
79
See id.
80
See id.
81
See id.
77
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purposes of determining party intent; to the extent that the court concludes
that the usage does not constitute a relevant circumstance, it is not helpful
in determining party intent. But there is no bright-line rule established
under Article 8(3) regarding the weight to be given to any particular usage;
the court is to give due consideration to any usage that either party offers as
evidence of the parties’ intent.82 This is so, even when the usage is not a
term of the contract.
b. Articles 4 and 18(3)
There are two other sub-articles of the CISG that use the term usage—
Articles 4 and 18(3).83 Article 4 addresses principles of invalidity. 84 Article
4 provides that, except as otherwise expressly provided in the CISG,
questions regarding the validity of the contract and its provisions and of any
usage are outside the scope of the CISG. 85 Such questions are therefore to
be answered by means of Article 7, which requires settling such questions
“in conformity with the general principles on which [the CISG] is based.” 86
If there are no such principles, then the questions that are not settled by the
CISG are to be settled “in conformity with the law applicable by virtue of
the rules of private international law.” 87 Of course, the validity of a usage
as a contract term, as with any contract term, is only relevant when the
usage is actually a term of the parties’ agreement. Knowing whether a
usage is a term of the parties’ agreement requires application of Article 9.
Article 18(3) describes what constitutes an acceptance in the formation
of a contract under the CISG.88 That is, performance of an act alone
normally cannot constitute acceptance (unless there is notice given to the
offeror).89 But it is possible that an applicable usage could allow
acceptance to occur by performance of an act (even without notice). 90 Of
course, knowing whether any such usage is applicable to the formation of
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90

See id.
See id. arts. 4 & 18(3).
See id. art. 4.
Id.
Id. art. 7(2).
Id.
See id. art. 18(3).
See id. art. 18(2).
Article 18(3) provides as follows:
However, if, by virtue of the offer or as a result of practices which the parties have
established between themselves or of usage, the offeree may indicate assent by
performing an act, such as one relating to the dispatch of the goods or payment of
the price, without notice to the offeror, the acceptance is effective at the moment
the act is performed, provided that the act is performed within the period of time
laid down in the preceding paragraph.

Id. art. 18(3).
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the contract between the parties also requires application of the principles
contained in Article 9.
It is Article 9 that is ultimately the relevant article for determining
whether a usage is a term of the parties’ agreement. Courts should thus
begin their analysis with the text of Article 9. To the extent a question
remains unanswered, the court should turn to the general principles on
which the CISG is based for additional guidance. 91
B. General Principles
As we seek to understand the role of usage under the CISG, it is
important to note that the CISG itself offers instruction regarding how to
interpret its provisions. Whenever there is a question concerning a matter
that is governed by the CISG and the question is not expressly settled by
some provision of the CISG, the question is to be answered “in conformity
with the general principles on which [the CISG] is based.” 92 While the
CISG does not define those general principles, a careful review of the CISG
can reveal numerous principles that permeate the CISG. This Article
identifies two arguably relevant principles on which the CISG is based.
Instead of resorting immediately to the UCC, courts should consider
carefully the general principles on which the CISG is based. Often that will
obviate the need—indeed, the appropriateness—of turning to domestic sales
law.
1. Freedom of Contract
One fundamental principle on which the CISG is based is freedom of
contract.93 The principle of freedom of contract permeates the CISG and its
provisions.94 Freedom of contract is formalized in Article 6 of the CISG,
which establishes clearly a right to depart from the default terms of the
CISG.95
Article 6 is subject only to Article 12, which establishes the
fundamental non-derogable terms of the CISG:
Any provision of article 11, 96 article 2997 or Part II98 of this
91

See id. art. 7(2).
Id. If, and only if, there are no applicable general principles available to answer the
question, then the question is to be answered “in conformity with the law applicable by
virtue of the rules of private international law.” Id.
93
See id. art. 6. Article 6 establishes a very broad freedom of contract. Subject only to
Article 12 of the CISG, the parties may “derogate from or vary the effect of any of [the
CISG’s] provisions.” Id (emphasis added).
94
See, e.g., id. arts. 9(2), 35(2), 58(3) & 65(1).
95
See id. art. 6.
96
“A contract of sale need not be concluded in or evidenced by writing and is not subject
to any other requirement as to form. It may be proved by any means, including witnesses.”
Id. art. 11.
92
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Convention that allows a contract of sale or its modification or
termination by agreement or any offer, acceptance or other indication
of intention to be made in any form other than in writing does not
apply where any party has his place of business in a Contracting
State which has made a declaration under article 96 of this
Convention. The parties may not derogate from or vary the effect of
this article.99

Article 12 has a limited effect for two reasons. First, the scope of
Article 12 is limited in that it relates only to domestic requirements as to
form. 100 Second, not many parties to the CISG (currently 11 out of 78
parties) have made a declaration under Article 96; the United States has not
made such a declaration.101
While some domestic sales laws establish broad categories of nonderogable terms, such as duties of good faith, reasonableness, and the like
(this is so under the UCC, for example), 102 the CISG simply does not. 103
97
Article 29(1) provides that “[a] contract may be modified or terminated by the mere
agreement of the parties.” Id. art. 29(1). Paragraph (2) of Article 29 continues:

A contract in writing which contains a provision requiring any modification or
termination by agreement to be in writing may not be otherwise modified or
terminated by agreement. However, a party may be precluded by his conduct from
asserting such a provision to the extent that the other party has relied on that
conduct.
Id. art. 29(2).
98
Part II of the CISG is concerned with formation of the contract. See id. Part.II.
99
Id. art. 12.
100
That is, Article 96 of the CISG allows parties to the CISG to declare that domestic
writing requirements, such as a domestic statute of frauds, will be effective, notwithstanding
the terms of the CISG that reject writing requirements, see CISG, supra note 12, art. 96, and
Article 12 provides that when an Article 96 declaration has been made, the domestic
requirements as to form prevail over the CISG’s rejection of requirements as to form. See id.
art. 12.
101
See CISG Status, supra note 12.
102
See, e.g., U.C.C. § 1-302(b) (2011).
103
For a contrary view, see LOOKOFSKY, supra note 20, at 165 (“The validity
(enforceability) of a standard term which (e.g.) purports to disclaim the obligations set forth
in Article 35(2) and/or limit liability in the event of breach is a question outside the CISG:
the Convention is simply ‘not concerned with’ the validity of clauses like these.”).
However, this view of the CISG is not supported by the text of the CISG. It is true that the
CISG is not concerned with the validity of the contract or of any of the contract’s provisions.
See CISG, supra note 12, art. 4. But that is so with respect to the validity of any clause in
the contract; there is no special treatment accorded to clauses purporting to limit either
party’s liability. Indeed, the CISG contemplates in other sections that a contract could
include such a clause. See, e.g., id. art. 19(3) (addressing how a contract term relating to the
“extent of one party’s liability to the other” should be analyzed in the battle of the forms).
The explanatory note supports this as well: “[W]hen a question concerning a matter
governed by this Convention is not expressly settled in it, the question is to be settled in
conformity with the general principles on which the Convention is based. Only in the
absence of such principles should the matter be settled in conformity with the law applicable
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Moreover, the CISG does not contain the same hurdles to modification of
certain important terms, such as warranty terms, that other bodies of sales
law contain. 104 Thus, parties generally have the autonomy to mutually
define their will regarding their respective contractual rights and duties.
The principle of freedom of contract under the CISG generally compels a
court to defer to the discernible will of the parties.
Ultimately, the principle of freedom of contract should inform and
guide a court’s approach to analysis of the CISG and the application of its
terms to a contract governed by the CISG. When the court can determine
the parties’ will, that will should generally govern. That naturally leads to
the next question, which is how best to determine the will of the parties
under the CISG. It leads also to the next general principle on which the
CISG is based: the principle of determining party intent.
2. Determining Party Intent
Article 8 of the CISG establishes fundamental principles regarding the
need to determine and the manner of determining party intent. 105 Article 8
does two especially important things. First, it provides that the actual intent
of the parties prevails over an inconsistent objective manifestation of intent
when the actual intent of the parties can be determined. 106 Second, it adopts
a very broad approach for determining party intent by requiring courts to
consider “all relevant circumstances.” 107
Article 8 of the CISG provides as follows:
(1) For the purposes of this Convention statements made by and
other conduct of a party are to be interpreted according to his intent
where the other party knew or could not have been unaware what
that intent was.
(2) If the preceding paragraph is not applicable, statements made by
and other conduct of a party are to be interpreted according to the
understanding that a reasonable person of the same kind as the other
party would have had in the same circumstances.

by virtue of the rules of private international law.” Id., Explanatory Note, ¶ 13.
104
See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-316(2) (2011) (establishing specific requirements as to form and
content that must be satisfied for the UCC implied warranties of merchantability and fitness
for particular purpose to be excluded under U.C.C. § 2-316(2)); cf. CISG, supra note 12, art.
35(2) (providing for warranties to exist by implication in a contract governed by the CISG,
except when the parties have “agreed otherwise,” and providing no specific requirements as
to form or content for such agreement).
105
See CISG, supra note 12, art. 8. For additional analysis by the author of the important
role that Article 8 should play in a court’s analysis of a contract governed by the CISG, see
Johnson, supra note 11, 266–87.
106
See CISG, supra note 12, art. 8.
107
Id. art. 8(3).
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(3) In determining the intent of a party or the understanding a
reasonable person would have had, due consideration is to be given
to all relevant circumstances of the case including the negotiations,
any practices which the parties have established between themselves,
usages and any subsequent conduct of the parties. 108

Under Article 8(3), the court must give due consideration to all
relevant circumstances of the case. Article 8(3) provides specific examples
of items that are relevant circumstances, including the parties’ negotiations,
established party practice, the parties’ conduct following formation of the
contract, and usage. 109 Courts must give due consideration to any and all of
these items in order to determine the intent of the parties, whether
determining actual intent or objective manifestation of intent. 110 Each party
must be given the opportunity to use such evidence to show that the parties
agreed on an actual understanding of their bargain, even when the evidence
might be inconsistent with the objective understanding that would otherwise
be given to the parties’ bargain.111
Looking carefully at Article 8, one can see that a party to a robust
written agreement, signed by both parties, might seek to introduce extrinsic
evidence of a “[practice] which the parties have established between
themselves”112 that tends to show that the parties have agreed outside the
four corners of their written agreement on an allocation of risk or
responsibility that seems to contradict the apparent allocation contained in
the written agreement. It is further possible that one of the parties might
introduce evidence of an applicable usage that further contradicts both the
party practice and the objective understanding of the express terms of the
written agreement. Courts must consider such evidence.
This is likely to be culturally difficult for some U.S. courts,
commentators, and practitioners, due to the sanctity under the U.S. parol
evidence rule of the written word.113 While the parol evidence rule of the
UCC would specifically preclude the possibility of such contradictory
evidence of the practice and of the usage when the writing is a final
expression of the parties’ agreement,114 Article 8 of the CISG specifically
calls for the court to give due consideration to the evidence of the party
108

Id. art. 8.
Id. art. 8(3).
110
See id. art. 8.
111
See id.
112
Id. art. 8(3)
113
See U.C.C. § 2-202 (2011) (providing that when the parties have put their agreement
in writing that constitutes a final expression of their agreement, those parties are then
prevented by the parol evidence rule from introducing any evidence of extrinsic terms that
would contradict the writing, and if the writing is a complete and exclusive statement of their
agreement, then the parties are largely prevented from introducing evidence of even
consistent terms).
114
See id.
109
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practice and of the usage. 115 Moreover, while the UCC establishes an order
of precedence for usage of trade, course of dealing, and course of
performance, Article 8 does not.
It is true that the writing, as an objective manifestation of the parties’
mutual intent to be bound, might ultimately prove to be the very best
evidence available of the actual intent of the parties, and it could be that
party practice might prove to be better evidence than usage of actual party
intent. But this is not always true. Under the principles established by
Article 8, the writing is not dispositive of the parties’ intent, and party
practice does not automatically prevail over usage when determining party
intent.
Like the principle of freedom of contract, the need to determine and
the method of determining party intent should inform and guide a court’s
approach to analysis of the CISG and the application of its terms to a
contract governed by the CISG. It is this principle that should inform the
court’s construction of any priority given to sources of the terms of a
contract governed by the CISG.
C. Discerning the Hierarchy
When there is usage that arguably has become part of the parties’
agreement through either Article 9(1), because the parties have agreed upon
that usage, or Article 9(2), because the usage satisfies the three discrete
requirements of Article 9(2) and the parties have not opted out of the usage,
such usage is as much part of the parties’ agreement as if it were written
into the written agreement. Any such usage will clearly prevail over default
provisions of the CISG, in accordance with the principle of freedom of
contract.116 But what if the usage conflicts with another express term of the
parties’ written agreement? Or with practices which the parties have
established between themselves? How do those distinct sources of contract
terms relate to each other?
Some commentators have argued persuasively that a practice
established by the parties between themselves ought to prevail over any
usage that would otherwise be part of the parties’ agreement as an implied
term under Article 9(2). 117 This view of Article 9 can be justified by the
“unless otherwise agreed” clause of Article 9(2). 118 Article 9(2) provides
for usage to become an implied term of the parties’ agreement when the
115

See CISG, supra note 12, art. 8(3).
See id. art. 6. “Taken together, Articles 6 and 9 confirm that the CISG default regime
plays ‘second fiddle’ to the specific kind of consensus often reached between merchants
working within the relevant trade environment (what some jurists aptly label the ‘bargain in
fact’).” LOOKOFSKY, supra note 20, at 44.
117
See, e.g., Franco Ferrari, What Sources of Law for Contracts for the International Sale
of Goods? Why One Has to Look Beyond the CISG, 25 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 314, 335–36
(2005).
118
CISG, supra note 12, art. 9(2).
116
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requirements of Article 9(2) are satisfied with respect to the usage in
question, but it also explicitly allows the parties to otherwise agree. 119 To
the extent that the parties can be deemed to have agreed that a practice
established between themselves is binding on them, if it conflicts with an
Article 9(2) usage, the parties have arguably implicitly otherwise agreed
that the usage is not part of their agreement. The argument has merit, and it
is one way that a conflict between an Article 9(2) usage and an Article 9(1)
party practice could be reconciled.
However, the text of Article 9 does not require such an order of
precedence in every instance.120 Rather, Article 9(2) establishes a
mechanism for usage to become an implied term of the parties’ agreement
(when the requirements of Article 9(2) are satisfied) unless the parties have
otherwise agreed. How the parties manifest such agreement is not
addressed by Article 9(2).
In addition, Article 9(1) provides that party practice can bind the
parties, but, unlike usage under Article 9(1), party practices are not binding
on the parties under Article 9(1) specifically as a result of party
agreement.121 Rather, it occurs when the parties have “established” the
practice between themselves.122 How the parties can establish the practice
between themselves is not addressed by Article 9. 123 In addition, because
Article 9(1) refers specifically to party agreement with respect to usage that
is binding on the parties and does not refer to party agreement with respect
to party practice it should not be assumed that an established party practice
necessarily is something to which the parties have agreed in the sense of
Article 9(2).
An order of precedence between party practice that is binding on the
parties under Article 9(2) and usage that is binding on the parties under
Article 9(1) is therefore simply not established by Article 9. Rather, courts
are bound to determine which contract term—the party practice or the
applicable usage—the parties intended should prevail. To determine that
party intent, courts should use the principles set forth in Article 8. In so
doing, the court may determine that the parties intended the express terms
of a writing to prevail over inconsistent party practice and usage and that
the parties intended some party practice to prevail over usage as a matter of
fact. However, it is important to recognize that the CISG does not compel
such an outcome as a matter of law, and it is improper to conclude as a
matter of law that party practice will trump an inconsistent usage every
time. Rather, careful factual inquiry and thoughtful analysis of the facts
found should be used to determine what the parties actually intended.
119
120
121
122
123
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D. Usage Intended to Prevail over Practice: An Illustration
An illustration helps to explain how not assuming that party practice
automatically prevails over usage can facilitate respecting the actual intent
of the parties. Imagine the following situation:
Seller is a Spanish corporation with its place of business in Spain.
Seller designs, produces, markets, and installs customized, complex
systems for use in a variety of industrial packaging and labeling
applications. Buyer is a Delaware corporation with its place of
business in the United States. Buyer is a supplier of automotive
products to the automotive industry and also supplies replacement
parts to consumers through automotive parts dealers. Buyer uses
packaging and labeling systems for its products.
Buyer plans to update and expand its manufacturing capacity and
requires six new packaging and labeling systems. Each system will
be shipped and installed individually over a period of eighteen
months. Each will be customized to fit the facility where it will be
used.
Buyer and Seller negotiate and agree on the basic terms of a deal for
the first system, including price, delivery date, warranty terms, and
the like (but not choice of law), and the parties reduce their
agreement to a writing, which both parties sign.
Within the applicable industry, both inspection and acceptance
testing of the systems are customary, including for cross-border
transactions. The inspection and acceptance testing process
routinely occur in two stages: the first stage customarily occurs at
the seller’s plant of manufacture prior to shipment, and the second
stage consists of a final acceptance test that takes place at the
buyer’s facility after installation is complete. It is customary in this
industry globally for the seller to bear the cost of such inspection
and testing (and the anticipated cost is typically built into the quote
and pricing for the equipment). Seller and Buyer are both aware of
all of the foregoing. The written agreement signed by Seller and
Buyer is silent on inspection and testing.
Seller commences performance and produces, delivers, and installs
the system. Buyer inspects the system and completes an acceptance
test only after delivery and installation. Buyer is satisfied with the
system, and the parties then execute a written agreement for a
second system, with different specifications and a new price and
delivery location and date, but otherwise identical to the first written
agreement. The parties perform under the second agreement.
Satisfied with the second system, Buyer decides to order the final
four systems, and the parties enter into a third written agreement,
this time for all four of the remaining systems Buyer wishes to
purchase. Seller commences performance, delivering and installing
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first one and then another system under the third written agreement.
During the course of production, delivery, and installation of the
first four systems (the individual systems under the first two written
agreements and the two systems under the third written agreement),
Buyer inspects and completes acceptance testing only at its facility
each time.
Upon delivery and installation of the fourth system, it becomes
evident to both parties that the system is defective and out of
specification, which appears at first blush to be due to
manufacturing error.
Seller quickly proposes a commercial solution at its expense, and
Buyer agrees. Seller repairs the defect and nonconformity to
Buyer’s satisfaction.
Now, however, Buyer informs Seller that it intends to exercise its
industry right to inspect and test the final two systems at Seller’s
facility, at Seller’s expense, prior to shipment. Seller resists, arguing
that there have been three systems with no problem; that Seller
accepted responsibility for the problems with the fourth; and that
there is therefore no need for costly and time-consuming preshipment inspection or testing by Buyer. (Unbeknownst to Buyer,
Seller has not accounted for the costs of pre-shipment inspection and
testing when quoting the prices for these six systems due to an
internal miscommunication. Seller also reasonably fears that this
would cause delay in its performance, which would put Seller in
breach.) Buyer replies that it is unwilling to accept delivery of the
final two systems without pre-shipment inspection and testing at
Seller’s expense; and Buyer is going to insist on its industrystandard right to inspect and test at Seller’s facility at Seller’s
expense. Seller argues that the parties have established both a
course of dealing and a course of performance that render any such
industry practice irrelevant.
Ultimately unable to resolve their disagreement, the parties find
themselves in litigation, with claims and counter-claims for breach
of contract, each party claiming that the other party has unjustifiably
refused to perform.

In order to determine which party is in breach by not performing, the
court hearing the parties’ respective claims will likely have to determine
whether the usage relating to pre-shipment inspection and testing is part of
the parties’ agreement, whether the parties’ practices have established a
term of their agreement, or both. If it is both, then the court will have to
determine which term the parties intended to prevail.
On its face, it appears that the parties have established a UCC course
of performance under the final written agreement and a course of dealing
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under the previous two agreements for inspection and acceptance testing of
the systems to occur after delivery only. 124 Applying Treibacher Industrie,
it would be fairly simple to conclude that the parties’ apparent course of
dealing prevails over any potentially applicable usage that would call for a
different outcome, obviating the need for any analysis of the parties’ intent
regarding the role usage should play, with the result that the parties’
contract only requires inspection and testing to occur after delivery has
occurred. But that is problematic at several levels. The CISG, which
governs the transaction in this Illustration, 125 requires a different analysis.
The CISG requires the court not to consider whether there is a course
of dealing or a course of performance—UCC terms and concepts that are
not reproduced in the CISG—but instead to determine whether there are
any practices which they have established between themselves. 126
Moreover, repeated performance in a particular way does not
automatically amount to a practice that the parties have established between
themselves.127 Because Article 9 tells us little regarding how to determine
whether the parties have established a practice between themselves, it is
necessary to consider the general principles on which the CISG is based to
make such a determination. 128 One such principle, established by Article 8,
is the principle of determining party intent, and it is therefore appropriate to
analyze whether the parties have even established a practice that they
intended to be bound by, with a preference for actual intent if it can be
determined.
Finally, even if we were to conclude that the parties have established a
practice between themselves, Article 9 does not provide that practices
established by the parties between themselves should automatically prevail
over a conflicting usage that is otherwise applicable to the parties’
agreement.129 Rather, general principles on which the CISG is based should
once again inform the court’s consideration of the precedence that should
be given.
Thus, the court must analyze usage described in the Illustration and its
relationship with apparent party practice in a way that is actually
contemplated by the CISG. It is entirely possible that a court would
conclude that the parties intended the usage concerning pre-shipment
testing and acceptance to be part of their agreement. It is possible that the
practice established by the first four instances of performance was not
124

See U.C.C. § 1-303(a)–(b) (2011).
Because the underlying contract is a contract of sale of goods between parties who
have their respective places of business in different countries (Spain and the United States),
and those countries are both parties to the CISG, the CISG applies by its terms. See CISG,
supra note 12, art. 1(1)(a).
126
Id. art. 9(1).
127
See id.
128
See id. art. 7(2).
129
See id. art. 9.
125
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intended to establish a different term of the parties’ agreement but was
instead merely a non-binding waiver by Buyer of an assertion of its
contractual rights in those instances. In that case, application of the
Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in Treibacher Industrie would yield the wrong
result.
Fortunately, the analysis contemplated by the CISG is not unwieldy.
Careful review of Article 9 and the general principles on which the CISG is
based suggests a useful analytical framework for dealing with difficult
questions under Article 9.
III. ARTICLE 9 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
By marching carefully through a series of four questions while
suspending UCC bias and assumptions, courts can analyze issues under
Article 9 and apply Article 9 in a way that is actually contemplated by the
CISG.
First, is there any usage to which the parties have agreed under
Article 9(1)? When determining the answer to this question, it is important
to note that such usage need not be a usage observed in international trade,
and it need not be widely known or regularly observed by third parties. 130 It
is enough that the contracting parties have in some way agreed to be bound
by the usage, have agreed to observe the usage, have agreed to make the
usage applicable to their agreement, or have otherwise explicitly or
implicitly agreed to the usage.131 Article 9(1) requires no particular means
of manifesting such agreement; it is a simple factual inquiry.
If a party claims that a usage is part of a contract under Article 9(1), it
is up to the finder of fact to determine whether, as a matter of fact, the
parties have agreed to the usage. And the party arguing for application of
the usage should bear the burden of showing that the parties have so agreed.
Part of the analysis should focus on whether the parties actually intended to
be bound by the usage, and that analysis should be grounded in the
principles contained in Article 8.
If the finder of fact finds that the parties have agreed to the usage, then
the usage is a term of the parties’ agreement. However, that does not
necessarily end the analysis. Sometimes a contract term is not enforceable
because it conflicts with another contract term. The continuing analysis
using the Article 9 analytical framework will help determine whether the
conflicting term is enforceable. But as a starting point, it is important to
recognize that the usage is, in fact, a term of the parties’ agreement, just as
surely as if it were written into the agreement itself.
Second, is there any practice that the parties have established
between themselves under Article 9(1)? It is important to note that the
130
131
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parties may have established a practice between themselves with or without
consciously agreeing to the practice. It is also important to note that a
practice may be established between the parties without constituting a
course of performance or a course of dealing under the UCC. Indeed, it is
inappropriate for courts to refer to or draw upon those UCC concepts when
analyzing whether the parties have established a practice between
themselves. Notably, Article 9(1) itself requires no particular means of
demonstrating that a practice has been established by the parties. 132 Once
again, this requires a factual inquiry to determine whether, as a matter of
fact, the parties have established a practice between themselves, and Article
8(3) of the CISG requires consideration of all relevant circumstances to
determine whether the parties intended to establish a practice between
themselves.
If a party claims that a practice is part of a contract under Article 9(1),
it is up to the finder of fact to determine whether, as a matter of fact, the
parties have established the practice between themselves. The party
arguing for application of the party practice should bear the burden of
showing that the parties have established the practice between themselves.
Part of the analysis should focus on whether the parties actually intended to
establish a practice between themselves or intended to be bound by a
practice. That analysis should be grounded in the principles contained in
Article 8.
If the finder of fact finds that the parties have established the practice
between themselves, then the party practice is a term of the parties’
agreement. This is so, even if the term based on the established party
practice conflicts with a usage that constitutes a term under Article 9(1).
Article 9(1) does not address how those conflicting terms should be
reconciled.133 Thus, once again, the analysis is not yet complete, but we
know that the party practice is, in fact, a term of the parties’ agreement.
Third, is there any usage that constitutes an implied term of the
parties’ agreement under Article 9(2)? This third question requires a more
involved, two-part analysis. The first part of the analysis focuses on
whether the usage is the type of usage that falls within the scope of Article
9(2).
In order to determine whether a usage is within the scope of Article
9(2), and therefore potentially an implied term of the parties’ agreement, the
court must consider whether three distinct requirements are satisfied with
respect to the usage in question.134
(i) Did each party know, or ought each party to have known, of the
claimed usage?
132
133
134

See id. art. 9(1).
See id.
See id. art. 9(2).
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(ii) Is the claimed usage a usage that in international trade is widely
known to parties to contracts of the type involved in the particular
trade concerned?
(iii) Is the claimed usage a usage that in international trade is
regularly observed by parties to contracts of the type involved in the
particular trade concerned?

The party arguing for application of the usage as an implied term
should bear the burden of showing that these three requirements have been
satisfied. If the answer to any of these three questions is “no,” then the
usage is not part of the parties’ agreement under Article 9(2).
If the answer to each of the questions is “yes” and the usage is
therefore the type of usage that falls within the scope of Article 9(2), then
the second part of the analysis asks whether the parties nevertheless opted
out of the usage. Specifically, did the parties agree not to have impliedly
made applicable to their contract the usage in question?
It is important to note that the inquiry in the second part of the analysis
is not whether the parties affirmatively agreed to make the usage applicable
to their contract. Such affirmative agreement is not required under Article
9(2).135 In fact, if there is such affirmative agreement, then Article 9(1) is
the appropriate section to apply. 136 Rather, the inquiry is whether the
parties have agreed not to make the usage a part of their agreement.
Notably, however, Article 9(2) requires no particular means of manifesting
that agreement. 137 Once again, it requires factual inquiry to determine
whether the parties have manifested such agreement.
Once the first part of the analysis shows that there is a usage that is
applicable under Article 9(2), then the burden should shift to the party who
would like to evade application of the usage as an implied term of the
parties’ agreement to show that the parties opted out of it.
If a party claims that a usage is part of a contract of sale of goods
under Article 9(2), it is up to the finder of fact to determine whether, as a
matter of fact, the usage is the type of usage that is within the scope of
Article 9(2) by applying the first part of the two-part analysis. If the other
party then claims that the parties have nevertheless opted out of the usage,
then it is up to the finder of fact to determine whether that other party has
met its burden to show that the parties have in fact opted out of the usage.
If the finder of fact finds that the usage is the type of usage that is within the
scope of Article 9(2) and does not find that the parties have opted out of the
usage, then the usage is a term of the parties’ agreement. This is so, even if
the usage conflicts with another contractual term that is based on
established party practice under Article 9(1). How those conflicting
135
136
137
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contractual terms should be reconciled is not expressly addressed in Article
9.
Fourth, we’ve identified terms of the contract under Article 9; do any
of these terms conflict with each other or with another apparent express
term of the contract? If so, which term prevails? If none of the terms
conflict with each other, then each is enforceable as a binding term of the
parties’ agreement (in the absence of an applicable domestic principle of
invalidity rendering the term unenforceable). 138
If there is a conflict, then the conflict must be resolved. Because the
text of Article 9 does not establish an order of precedence, the conflict must
be resolved by reference to the general principles on which the CISG is
based. 139
As we have seen, the principle of freedom of contract enshrined in
Article 6 generally requires deference to the will of the parties. And the
principles pertaining to determining party intent established in Article 8
require deference to the parties’ actual intent, if actual intent can be
determined, and to objective intent, if actual intent cannot be determined,
after giving due consideration to all relevant circumstances. 140
Thus, the objective of the finder of fact should be to determine whether
the parties actually intended one contractual term to prevail over another. If
determinable, that actual intent should establish the order of precedence. If
actual intent is not determinable, then the fact finder should focus on the
objective manifestation of the parties’ intent regarding the order of
precedence. In either case, the inquiry should be fact-intensive and
conducted on a case-by-case basis. Such an inquiry should focus on all of
the evidence available, including party communications, party conduct, and
usage. Ultimately, it is the responsibility of the fact finder to find the facts
by weighing all available evidence as best the fact finder can, and to make a
determination that does not assume any hierarchy.
IV. THE TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES OF THE CISG
The travaux préparatoires support the foregoing analytical framework.
When the text of a treaty is insufficient to answer a question definitively,
the treaty’s travaux préparatoires, or drafting history, should be considered.
Specifically, a treaty’s drafting history is relevant to confirm the text,
context, object, and purpose of the treaty, and to resolve ambiguity, as well
as to prevent a manifestly absurd or unjust result.141 It is therefore
138

See id. art. 4.
See id. art. 7(2).
140
See id. art. 8.
141
See Vienna Convention, supra note 66, arts. 31(2) & 32. U.S. courts, in particular,
have shown a willingness to use a treaty’s travaux préparatoires to interpret the treaty.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 325
reporters’ n.1 (1987) (“United States courts, accustomed to analyzing legislative materials,
139
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important to consider what, if anything, the travaux préparatoires tell us
about the hierarchical relationship between applicable usage and other
means of determining the contents of the parties’ contract.
A draft of the CISG was prepared by the United Nations Commission
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), and a diplomatic conference of
plenipotentiaries consisting of representatives of 62 independent states,
including the United States, was convened in 1980 to consider the draft.142
Close examination of the travaux préparatoires of the conference reveals
that the drafters considered an amendment to Article 9 that would have had
the effect of creating a hierarchy as between usage and party conduct.
The First Committee of the Conference considered the draft
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods approved by
UNCITRAL.143 And several amendments to Article 9 (numbered in the
draft as Article 8) were proposed. 144 An amendment proposed by Pakistan
would have placed usage in a subsidiary position to the conduct of the
parties by proposing the following amendment: “Replace the words ‘unless
otherwise agreed’ in paragraph (2) of article [9] by the words ‘unless their
conduct shows otherwise’.”145 Later, the Pakistan representative clarified
that the proposed language was to be added to Article 9(2) without
replacing any text.146 Thus, Article 9(2) would have read as follows:

have not been hesitant to resort to travaux préparatoires.”).
142
See United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
Vienna, Austria, Mar. 10–Apr. 11, 1980, Final Act of the United Nations Conference on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, ¶¶ 1–3, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/18 (Apr. 11,
1980), reprinted in United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods, Official Records, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/19, at 176–77 (1991) [hereinafter Official
Records], available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/cisg/a-conf-97-19ocred-e.pdf; see also CISG, supra note 12, CISG Explanatory Note, available at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/sales/cisg/V1056997-CISG-e-book.pdf.
143
United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Vienna,
Austria, Mar. 10–Apr. 11, 1980, Text of Draft Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods approved by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/5 (Mar. 14, 1979), reprinted in Official Records, supra note 142, at
5–14.
144
“Amendments were submitted to [Article 8] by China (A/CONF.97/C.1/L.24),
Czechoslovakia
(A/CONF.97/C.1/L.40),
India
(A/CONF.97/C.1/L.34),
Sweden
(A/CONF.97/C.1/L.19), Pakistan (A/CONF.97/C.1/L.64), United States of America
(A/CONF.97/C.1/L.6), France (A/CONF.97/C.1/L.23) and Egypt (A/CONF.97/C.1/L.44).”
United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Vienna,
Austria, Mar. 10–Apr. 11, 1980, Report of the First Committee, art. 8, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.97/11 (Apr. 7, 1980) [hereinafter Report of the First Committee], reprinted in
Official Records, supra note 142, at 89.
145
Id. ¶ 3(v) [sic].
146
United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Vienna,
Austria, Mar. 10–Apr. 11, 1980, Summary Records of the First Committee, 7th Meeting, ¶
26, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/C.1/SR.7 (Mar. 14, 1980) [hereinafter Summary Records–7th
Meeting], reprinted in Official Records, supra note 142, at 266.

294

Elevating “Usage” to its Rightful Position For Contracts Governed by the CISG
32:263 (2012)

The parties are considered, unless otherwise agreed or unless their
conduct shows otherwise, to have impliedly made applicable to their
contract or its formation a usage of which the parties knew or ought
to have known and which in international trade is widely known to,
and regularly observed by, parties to contracts of the type involved in
the particular trade concerned.

That amendment arguably would have had the effect of creating an
automatic hierarchy between usage that would otherwise be part of the
parties’ agreement under Article 9(2) and inconsistent party conduct. But
the Pakistan amendment was rejected, and no hierarchy was established. 147
One delegate’s explanation for his opposition underscores why it is
sensible not to assume that party practice should automatically prevail over
binding usage:
Mr. HJERNER (Sweden) said that the Pakistan amendment
(A/CONF.97/C.1/L.64) seemed attractive at first sight but raised the
question of what conduct was relevant for purposes of interpretation,
especially in regard to implied acceptance.
Doubts came
immediately to mind regarding the relevant time: was the conduct in
question the conduct at the time of conclusion of the contract or that
of a later time, when a reluctant party failed to comply with the
custom in question? He accordingly urged that the text should be
left as it stood.148

Thus, the absence of an automatic hierarchy between usage and party
practice is the result of an apparently deliberate, reasoned decision.
V. RECENT CONTINUATION OF IMPROPER IMPOSITION OF
AUTOMATIC HIERARCHY
Nevertheless, the absence of an automatic hierarchy has not yet been
recognized by U.S. courts.
This particular misunderstanding and
misapplication of Article 9 of the CISG continues as U.S. courts continue to
have difficulty recognizing the analysis required under Article 9 in light of
the general principles on which the CISG is based.
A. Hanwha Corp. v. Cedar Petrochemicals, Inc.
Early in 2011, a U.S. federal court heard a case involving a contract
dispute that grew out of a battle of the forms. 149 The question of contract
formation was governed by the CISG.150 On cross-motions for summary
judgment, the plaintiff, Hanwha Corporation (“Hanwha”), a Korean
147
148
149
150

Report of the First Committee, supra note 144 ¶ 6.
Summary Records–7th Meeting, supra note 146, ¶ 28 (emphasis added).
Hanwha Corp., 760 F. Supp. 2d at 428–29.
See id. at 431.
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company and the would-be buyer in the sale of goods transaction at issue,
argued that summary judgment was inappropriate because disputed issues
of fact “regarding the norms of contracting practices in the Korean
petrochemicals industry” remained unresolved. 151 Citing no authority, the
court perfunctorily dismissed that argument, reasoning that when “parties
have established a course of dealing between themselves, industry norms
that might otherwise apply are irrelevant.” 152 That statement, of course, is
simply not true under the CISG. Unfortunately for Hanwha, the court
improperly denied it the opportunity to show that the parties actually
intended the norms of contracting practices in the Korean petrochemicals
industry to constitute a part of their agreement.
To be clear, Hanwha should not have automatically prevailed on the
merits of its argument regarding Korean norms even if the court applied the
analytical framework required by Article 9. Hanwha would have been
required to meet its burden of showing that the norm constituted a part of
the agreement as usage under either Article 9(1) or Article 9(2). Then, to
the extent the usage conflicted with another term, the court would have
been required to determine that the usage in question was intended by the
parties to prevail over the other term. That might have been difficult. Still,
Hanwha should have had the opportunity to offer evidence showing that the
norms were part of the parties’ agreement under Article 9.
Because the court provided no authority for its conclusion, 153 it is
unclear what it was that led the court to its conclusion. However, it
certainly seems likely that this conclusion was grounded in the court’s
understanding of the UCC. Indeed, earlier in its opinion the court reasoned
that UCC analysis could be appropriate when the CISG provision at issue is
analogous to a UCC provision.154 Similarly, the court seems to be
implicitly reasoning that course of dealing prevails over inconsistent usage
of trade, which would be accurate under the UCC.155 Finally, the court’s
reference to course of dealing betrays the court’s unfortunate ignorance of
the applicable provisions of the CISG.
B. Geneva Pharmaceuticals Technology Corp. v. Barr Laboratories, Inc.
In another example, Geneva Pharmaceuticals, a complex case
involving numerous parties, antitrust and breach-of-contract claims, and
151

Id. at 433.
Id.
153
See id.
154
See id. at 430.
155
See U.C.C. § 1-303(e)(3) (2011). Even under the UCC, however, the court would
nevertheless be obligated to consider usage of trade and to attempt to reconcile applicable
course of dealing and usage of trade that appear to be inconsistent with each other. See id.
(“Except as otherwise provided in subsection (f), the express terms of an agreement and any
applicable course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade must be construed
whenever reasonable as consistent with each other.”).
152
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complicated facts, the U.S. bias and disregard for the text of the CISG was
especially egregious.156 The court determined that the CISG governed the
sales contract at issue.157 In its recitation of potentially applicable
provisions of the CISG, the court wildly mischaracterized Article 9,
misstating the method of determining whether usage and party practice are
terms of the parties’ agreement: “The usages and practices of the parties or
the industry are automatically incorporated into any agreement governed by
the [CISG], unless expressly excluded by the parties.” 158 Despite its
conclusion that the CISG governed, the court ultimately relied on non-CISG
case law, including a 1949 decision that predated the CISG, to conclude
that a party could not “rely on industry custom to trump an agreed-upon
obligation.”159 In that portion of the court’s analysis, the court never even
considered Article 9 of the CISG, opting instead to rely on non-CISG case
law. 160
VI. FAILING TO CONSIDER USAGE
Courts are not the only ones to misunderstand Article 9. Contracting
parties also do not always recognize the roles usage can play under Articles
8 and 9 of the CISG and therefore sometimes fail to make the argument that
usage ought to help define the terms of the contract or party intent.
A. Contract Formation
In one of the early decisions by a U.S. court applying Article 9 of the
CISG, the court had before it a motion for summary judgment in a dispute
involving an Italian seller of shoes, Calzaturificio Claudia S.n.c. (Claudia),
and a U.S buyer, Olivieri Footwear Ltd. (Olivieri). 161 Claudia brought a
breach of contract claim (among other claims) against Olivieri and moved
for summary judgment on the basis of Claudia’s invoices and the delivery
terms set forth in those invoices. 162
In considering the motion, the court applied the CISG. 163 The court
correctly recognized that, under the CISG, it was required to consider a
broader spectrum of evidence than it normally would under the UCC. 164
Claudia’s invoices certainly constituted one kind of evidence of party intent
that was appropriate for the court to consider. In addition, the court
156

See Geneva Pharm. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d 236, 281–85
(S.D.N.Y. 2002), rev’d on other grounds, 386 F.3d 485 (2d Cir. 2004).
157
See id. at 281 n.26.
158
Id. at 281.
159
Id. at 284.
160
See id. at 281–85.
161
See Claudia, 1998 WL 164824 at *1.
162
See id. at *1–2.
163
See id. at *4.
164
See id. at *5.
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recognized the need to consider other evidence, including “[e]vidence
concerning any negotiations, agreements, or statements made prior to the
issuance of the invoices in issue . . . .”165 It quoted Article 9 of the CISG,
reasoning that the parties were bound by any usage to which they have
agreed, as well as by any practices they had established.166
In conducting its analysis, the court then considered Claudia’s
invoices, Olivieri’s faxes, and third-party shipping documents, as well as
the apparent practices of the parties, all as evidenced by the available
record.167 In so doing, the court appears to have engaged in the kind of
analysis required by the CISG under Articles 8 and 9.
Interestingly, there is no reference in the court’s analysis to any
potentially applicable usage. Is this absence of any reference to usage due
to the court’s assumption that the practices established by the parties would
prevail over inconsistent usage? Is it due to the absence of relevant usage in
the applicable industry? Is it simply due to failure by the parties to
recognize the role that usage can play in determining party intent and
establishing the terms of the parties’ contract, and thus, a failure to offer
evidence of potentially applicable usages? Because the court does not
address the issue, it is difficult to conclude with certainty which of the
foregoing is true.
It seems unlikely that the court affirmatively concluded that the
parties’ practices prevailed over inconsistent usage. In fact, despite
Claudia’s arguments regarding the parties’ practices, the court concluded
that Claudia had “simply not submitted sufficient evidence to demonstrate
conclusively the parties’ prior practices. . . “168 Therefore, unless there is
some other explanation, the parties may have missed an opportunity to
construct a favorable argument based on usage.
B. Obligation to Pay Interest and the Applicable Interest Rate
Similarly, in another early decision by a U.S. court applying Article 9
of the CISG, one of the main issues before the court on post-trial motions
for judgment as a matter of law and, alternatively, a new trial, was the rate
of interest that had been awarded to the plaintiff, Zapata Hermanos
Sucesores, S.A. (Zapata), a Mexican seller, by the jury.169 Although it
ultimately reduced the damages awarded to Zapata by a small amount, 170
the court essentially held for Zapata, finding adequate support for the jury’s
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Id. at *6.
See id.
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See Claudia, 1998 WL 164824 at *6–8.
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Id. at *8.
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See Zapata Hermanos Sucesores, S.A. v. Hearthside Baking Co., Inc., No. 99 C 4040,
2001 WL 877538, at *2–4 (N.D. Ill. July 19, 2001).
170
See id. at *2.
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findings. 171
The defendant, Hearthside Baking Co., Inc. doing business as Maurice
Lenell Cooky Company (Lenell), argued that no interest whatsoever was
payable because Lenell was never in arrears, an argument that Lenell
constructed based on its course of conduct under the parties’ contract. 172
Zapata countered Lenell’s argument by referring to express payment terms
in the order documents, which seemed to contemplate the possibility that
Lenell could be in payment default.173 The court concluded that the
question of interest was ultimately a question for the jury, and the jury
weighed the evidence and found in Zapata’s favor.174
In considering the role played by the jury, the court included by
footnote the relevant jury instruction, which addressed damages recoverable
by Zapata if the jury found a breach of contract by Lenell. 175 The jury
instruction addressed recovery of interest on any amounts past due, and it
suggested that the jury was entitled to find, as a matter of fact, that the
parties agreed—either expressly or even through a course of conduct—that
no interest was recoverable.176 If the parties did not agree that no interest
was recoverable, then the jury was instructed to determine the rate of
interest, which would be the rate agreed upon by the parties, if any, or a
reasonable rate if none was agreed upon by the parties. 177
The jury was also instructed on finding the terms of any contracts that
might have formed between Zapata and Lenell, including terms established
by “the parties’ course of dealings [if the course of dealing became] part of
the common understanding between the parties.” 178
The overall emphasis on finding and deferring to the agreement of the
parties is laudable. But of course, the instruction should have referred not
to course of dealing but instead to practices the parties established between
themselves, and it should have included instructions allowing the jury to
determine whether the parties were bound by any usage. 179 Reference to
Article 9 of the CISG or usage was also notably absent from the court’s
analysis.
Usage could have been helpful to one or the other of the parties here.
Usage might have been relevant to show that interest either was or was not
customarily paid in the applicable trade. Usage might also have been
relevant to show an appropriate default rate of interest or a method of
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179

See id. at *1.
See id. at *3.
See id.
See id.
See Zapata, 2001 WL 877538 at *3 n.6.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See CISG, supra note 12, art. 9(1).
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determining that rate.
It is entirely possible that there was no identifiable rate of interest that
either party could show would amount to such usage. It is also possible that
any such rate was lower than the rate desired by Zapata and higher than the
rate Lenell was willing to accept. It is also possible, however, that the
parties failed to consider looking to potentially applicable usage to
determine the applicable rate of interest. Given the absence of any
discussion of usage, the absence of careful analysis of Articles 8 and 9 of
the CISG, and the court’s references to UCC terms, it seems likely that
there was a simple failure to recognize that the analysis under the CISG is
different from UCC analysis.
More recently, in San Lucio, S.r.l. v. Import & Storage Services, LLC,
there was a dispute between an Italian supplier and U.S. buyers of cheese,
and the parties agreed that the dispute was governed by the CISG. 180 The
supplier, San Lucio, S.r.l. (San Lucio), brought a claim against the buyers
for breach of the buyers’ payment obligations and filed a motion for partial
summary judgment seeking an order that Italian, not U.S., law would
govern determination of the applicable rate of prejudgment interest and
recovery of attorneys’ fees. 181 In considering San Lucio’s request for
prejudgment interest and attorneys’ fees pursuant to Italian law, the court
noted that Article 78 of the CISG entitles a party to prejudgment interest
when the other party fails to make or is late in making a payment that is
due. 182 The rate of interest, however, is not established by the CISG, and
the court resorted to U.S. law to fix the rate. 183 Similarly, the court noted
that the CISG is silent on payment of attorneys’ fees. 184 Even though
Italian law provides for attorneys’ fees to be awarded to the prevailing
party, the court noted that U.S. law does not. 185 Consequently, attorneys’
fees were not recoverable because U.S. law was applied. 186
The court in San Lucio, S.r.l. conducted a reasonably cogent analysis
of the CISG, but it leapt too quickly to domestic law to determine whether
attorneys’ fees were recoverable. Moreover, there may have been another
missed opportunity here to consider usage. As with the Zapata Hermanos
Sucesores, S.A. decision,187 the applicable rate of interest was in dispute,
and usage might have been helpful in resolving that dispute. It is also
possible that there was applicable usage relating to the ability of a
prevailing party to recover attorneys’ fees. In either case, the parties might
180

See San Lucio, S.r.l. v. Imp. & Storage Servs., LLC, Civil Action No. 07-3031
(WJM), 2009 WL 1010981, at *1 (D.N.J. Apr. 20, 2009).
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have missed an opportunity to construct a favorable argument based on
some potentially applicable usage.
CONCLUSION
If the contracting parties have taken the time and incurred the cost
necessary to put in place a robust written agreement establishing the
relevant agreed-upon terms of their arrangement, a party should be
foreclosed from attempting to evade its unambiguous responsibilities under
the agreement by incorporating a more favorable contract term based on
otherwise applicable usage under Article 9 of the CISG. The role of the
court is to determine the parties’ intent—actual intent, when possible—and
the written contract in that case very likely offers the best evidence
available of the actual intent of the parties.
But if, as is often the case in the fast-paced world of commercial
transactions, the parties have not reduced their agreement to a writing, then
each of the parties would be remiss not to consider potentially applicable
usage as one important source for determining the binding terms of the
contract of sale of goods between the parties.
Whether there is an apparent written agreement or not, if either party
seeks to introduce evidence of usage as a potential term of the parties’
agreement, then the court must consider whether the usage in question has
become a term of the parties’ agreement. The court must do this without
giving automatic preference to any other source of contract terms, including
any practices the parties seem to have established between themselves and
any conduct of the parties.
Naturally, the concerned commercial lawyer might chafe at the notion
that an express agreement, mutually adopted by the parties, could somehow
later be undermined by a creative (and perhaps spurious) argument based on
some discovered usage that would call for an allocation of risk or
responsibility that is different from that established by the written
agreement. To be clear, this Article does not advocate for using usage to
undermine the bargain in fact that has been struck by the parties, nor does
the CISG compel—or even permit—such a result. Rather, the CISG
contemplates determining the actual intent of the parties and deferring to
their will. 188 What better evidence of that actual intent is there than the
parties’ own written agreement? Ultimately, it is likely that a robust written
agreement that has been affirmatively adopted by the parties is the very best
evidence available for determining the parties’ actual intent to be bound.
Similarly, the actual conduct of the parties could offer good evidence
regarding their mutual understanding of their bargain.
But the truth is that sometimes parties adopt writings that are
inaccurate or incomplete. At other times, one party will offer up a writing
188

See CISG, supra note 12, arts. 6 & 8.
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that it claims constitutes the agreement between the parties, but that writing
might not reflect the parties’ actual bargain. When that happens, the writing
may not be good evidence of the parties’ actual intent at all. Article 8 of the
CISG recognizes this and instructs courts to consider all the circumstances,
including usage, when determining what the parties intended. This is true
even when there is a writing and the writing seems at first blush to compel a
certain outcome.
Similarly, sometimes parties engage in conduct that is not required by
their contract. And that conduct might be inconsistent with an otherwise
applicable usage. The usage can be a binding term of the contract under
Article 9 of the CISG nevertheless. The mere fact that parties have engaged
in certain conduct that appears to constitute an established practice should
not foreclose the possibility of considering usage as the contract term that
ought to prevail, to the extent such a priority was actually intended by the
parties, which is a question of fact. Deeming usage irrelevant when there
appears to be party conduct that is inconsistent with the usage ignores that
possibility and can lead to the actual intent of the parties being ignored.
That result is not consistent with the CISG. Courts surely should consider
the contents of any relevant writing and any actual conduct of the parties.
But “the investigation is not to be limited to those words or conduct even if
they appear to give a clear answer to the question.” 189
Unfortunately for decision makers, there is no bright-line rule that
emerges when analyzing and applying Article 9 of the CISG. However,
there is an analytical framework courts can use by marching through the
individual parts of Article 9 to determine the terms of the contract. If any of
the terms of the parties’ agreement conflict with each other, then it is up to
the finder of fact to determine which contract term the parties intended to
prevail, without assuming an automatic hierarchy.
When there is a usage that is arguably relevant for supplying a term of
the contract between the parties and there is also an apparent practice that
the parties seem to have established between themselves, the practice, as
something affirmatively undertaken by the parties, could reflect the parties’
actual intent regarding their mutual agreement to be bound. But this will
not be true in every instance, and the CISG does not compel—or even
allow—the conclusion that the practice automatically prevails over the
usage. On the contrary, the CISG requires giving due consideration to the
possibility that the parties intended the usage to prevail over the practice. If
that was the parties’ intent, then the court should defer to party intent and
recognize the usage as an enforceable, binding term of the parties’
agreement that is not trumped by party practice. By doing so, the ex ante
189

United Nations Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Vienna,
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will of the parties is respected.
But U.S. courts have largely failed to look carefully at the text of
Article 9 and have not considered the possibility that usage could prevail
over conduct or party practice. Courts are obligated to consider that
possibility, and it is important that they live up to that obligation for the
sake of the rule of law and for promoting uniformity, predictability and
certainty in international trade and commerce. Until courts get this analysis
consistently right, there will continue to be unnecessary and undesirable
uncertainty regarding binding terms of contracts governed by the CISG.
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